Support for lateralization of the Whorf effect beyond the realm of color discrimination

Brain and Language (v.105-2)
by Aubrey L. Gilbert, Terry Regier, Paul Kaye, and Richard B. Ivry

Recent work has shown that Whorf effects of language on color discrimination are stronger in the right visual field than in the left. Here we show that this phenomenon is not limited to color: The perception of animal figures (cats and dogs) was more strongly affected by linguistic categories for stimuli presented to the right visual field than those presented to the left. Moreover, the magnitude of the visual field asymmetry was reduced when demands on verbal working memory were increased by a secondary task. This reduction did not occur when the secondary task imposed demands on spatial working memory. Taken together, these results demonstrate that the lateralized Whorf effect may be quite general, reflecting an interaction of linguistic and perceptual codes primarily in the left hemisphere.

From the "Lateralization" dept. Since language appears to be lateralized it then follows that you process things with your right eye differently than you do with your left eye because right eye processing might be influenced, however slightly, from your left lateralized language processing component. That's awesome! Good on Gilbert for doing this work (check out her dissertation for more in-depth analysis of this type of evidence).

So are we one step closer to declaring a winner of the fight on linguistic relativism?

Articulatory settings of French and English monolingual and bilingual speakers

Dissertation from The University of British Columbia
by Wilson, I.L.

Abstract:

This dissertation investigates articulatory setting (AS), a language's underlying or default posture of the articulators (i.e., the tongue, jaw, and lips). Inter-speech posture (ISP) of the articulators (the position of the articulators when they are motionless during inter-utterance pauses) is used as a measure of AS in Canadian English and Quebecois French. The dissertation reports two experiments using a combination of Optotrak and ultrasound imaging to test whether ISP is language specific in both monolingual and bilingual speakers, whether it is affected by phonetic context, and whether it is influenced by speech mode (monolingual or bilingual). Results of Experiment 1 show significant differences in ISP across the English and French monolingual groups, with English exhibiting a higher tongue tip, more protruded upper and lower lips, and narrower horizontal lip aperture. Results also show that for English speakers, the jaw ISP is somewhat influenced by phonetic context while the lip and tongue ISP are not. For French speakers, only certain lip components of ISP are influenced by phonetic context while the ISP of the tongue and jaw are not. Results of Experiment 2 show that upper and lower lip protrusion are greater for the English ISP than for the French ISP, in all bilinguals who were perceived as native speakers of both of their languages, but in none of the other bilinguals. Also, tongue tip height results mirrored those of the monolingual groups, for half of the bilinguals perceived as native speakers of both languages, but for no other bilinguals. Finally, results show that there is no unique bilingual-mode ISP, but instead one that is equivalent to the monolingual-mode ISP of a speaker's currently most-used language. This research empirically confirms centuries of non-instrumental evidence for the existence of AS, and thus supports calls for the teaching of AS to L2 learners. Additionally, the lack of phonetic carry-over effect on ISP is encouraging for studies that have used ISP as a measurement baseline. Finally, the fact that there is no unique ISP for bilingual speech mode suggests that differences between monolingual and bilingual modes do not hold at the phonetic level.

From the "Crazy interesting stuff we don't normally think of" dept. I'm not really 100% clear about what it tells us, but I think it's fascinating that speakers of different languages would have different 'rest' positions for their articulators. I'm not sure that it's possible to teach second language learners how to achieve more natural rest positions, but it would be really great to see in what way having a non-native rest position might influence the production of a second language, or whether a late acquired second language can lead to a change in rest position of articulators when speaking that second language. Fascinating!

Toward a linguistic conception of thought

Dissertation from the University of Washington
by Stenberg, B.J.

Abstract:

The traditional, and still most common, view of the relationship between language and thought is that language is merely a tool for expressing thoughts. I argue that this view is mistaken and that language is the very thing that makes thought possible in the first place. I mean a number of things by this. I mean that no one can have any thoughts at all without first being a practiced member of a linguistic community. I mean literally that the thoughts themselves are linguistic entities: thoughts are, as it is sometimes put, just 'sentences in the head.' And, furthermore, I mean that thoughts are actually constituted by symbols of the natural language(s) one speaks. I call this view the Linguistic Theory of Thought (LTT), and it is a version of the Representational Theory of Mind. The main goal of my project is to lay the foundation for the LTT: to show that it is at the very least a coherent possibility, and find space for it among its representationalist peers. Having found a general place for the LTT to sit, I proceed to argue that this position is stable. First I develop a theory of meaning, adapting Wilfrid Sellars' view that specifying the meaning of a linguistic type involves classifying that type functionally. By treating meaning as functional classification I can specify the meanings of words without appealing to any supposedly antecedent thoughts. Next I argue that thinking is a matter of social practice. In this part of the project I rely on the philosophical framework provided by Sellars (his 'Psychological Nominalism'), and then modify the Sellarsian framework to support my view that our thoughts themselves are constituted by the symbols of the natural language(s) we speak. Ultimately, my project is both a modernizing of Sellars' view, developing and broadening his arguments in order to critique many of the representationalists that wrote (and continue to write) after him, and the development of a modern representationalist theory of thought that takes seriously the insights of Sellars, Quine, and those who have followed in their footsteps.

From the "Seriously, WTF!" dept. Seriously. WTF? We're going to use logic to prove what thought is made of? Haven't we outgrown this bullshit? It's the 21st century, who is still persuaded by this kind of argumentation w.r.t. cognitive processes? I guess I shouldn't prejudge without reading the dissertation, but INSPIRE HOPE this abstract does not.

Showing what we see: Psychoanalytic vision, transparency, and linguistic pragmatics

Dissertation from Duquesne University
By Bortle, S.

Abstract:

This dissertation explores the possibilities that pragmatic linguistic analytic methods might have for psychoanalysis, both in the latter's attempts to establish itself as an empirically grounded endeavor and in its understanding of its own theoretical constructs. I begin with a discussion of some of the troubles psychoanalysis has had in legitimizing itself in the eyes of its peers since in inception, suggesting that a closer relationship with already-established sociolinguistic sciences (i.e. pragmatic analysis of linguistic interaction) may aid in its promotion. I then describe how these methods have already been taken up within the field of psychology in the study of therapy process, noting a gap in the research such that they have yet to be brought to bear on the analysis of psychoanalytic constructs. I discuss some theoretical overlaps that already exist between psychoanalytic theory and the linguistic philosopher John Austin (namely critiques of modern subjectivity and the function of language) and give examples of possible conceptual intersections that might be further expanded in the future. I discuss repression and projective identification as two such possibilities. I conclude with some of the implications and limitations of this dialogue, noting that a pragmatic perspective might be better suited to interpersonal theories of psychoanalysis. I discuss the hegemonizing risk inherent in the metaphor of vision. I also address in what way linguistic pragmatic methods---and a psychoanalytic theory that centers itself around the construct of unconscious intention---can in the end be said to be "empirical." While these problems are not likely be solved in the near future, a continued discussion of them, stemming from viewing psychoanalytic constructs through a pragmatic lens, will nonetheless be fruitful.

From our "WTF" department. WTF?